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Russian-European Relations among Hostility and Fear
Lara Piccardo
The collapse of the USSR, the dissolution of the Eastern bloc, and the ﬁfth 
enlargement of the European Union have radically changed the political map of the “old 
continent”. Today, “political Europe” consists of the enlarged EU, taking in three former 
Soviet republics and seven central European “satellites”; a few additional countries, 
which in some cases are candidates or potential candidates for EU membership (such 
as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo); and Russia.
Following the admission of twelve (and then thirteen) new countries into the EU, 
Russia’s neighbors Ukraine and Belarus now share borders with the EU, and Kaliningrad 
is completely encircled by EU member States.
In modifying the geopolitical map of the “old continent” so radically, the 
completion of the ﬁfth enlargement of the EU (which had two phases, one in 2004, 
and one in 2007) was greeted with dismay in Moscow. The Kremlin’s disappointment 
is rooted in history, which shows how the “new” Russia shares with the “old” one and 
with the Soviet Union some aspects of its foreign policy. The Soviet/Russian policy 
toward the European Economic Community (EEC)/EU is a case in point.
Since the beginning of the European construction process, by focusing on the 
ideological prophecies of capitalist contradictions, communist authorities did not 
understand the potential signiﬁcance of the eﬀorts of people like Jean Monnet, directed 
at economic, ﬁnancial, and cultural integration (Namazova, Emerson 2005). And 
although the Soviet bloc economy needed economic relations with Western Europe, 
its political rulers rejected the idea of any European federation or confederation on 
the old continent (Aleksandrov-Agentov 1994; Zubok 1996; Soglian 1997).
Even before the birth of the Soviet Union, Europe and Russia had always looked to 
each other with diﬃdence or fear. Speciﬁcally, the geographical and identity location 
of Russia has always suﬀered because of the ambiguity of being a border between 
East and West, between Asia and Europe. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to 
measure the Russian swing between East and West by the yardstick of its greater or 
lesser Europeanization: this view would presuppose an implicit hierarchical relationship 
between Europe and Russia, of which historians should “estimate” progress or involution 
taking “Russia’s Europeanisation” as a single unit of measure (Masoero 2015: 176).
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On the contrary, the relationship between Europe – understood in diﬀerent 
historical moments as a geographical reality and/or as European Community/Union – 
and Russia has from time to time been expressed by the Russians in a complex reception 
of European or non-European models. Moreover, Russia looks at this relationship with 
the ambition to be an autonomous driving force because of belief to identify itself as 
the center of the world and not as a periphery.
So it is important to analyzes how Western Europe and Russia, being located 
within a common geographical area, have historically created a web of relationships 
characterized by attraction and repulsion, conditioned for centuries by ideology and 
power logic and often degenerated into contradictions and incompatibility.
1. When Russia Discovered Europe … and Europe Discovered Russia
Russia-Europe relations started to take shape only at the end of the 17th century 
(Duroselle 1964: 159-160): at that time, Muscovy needed the West to establish the army, 
to modernize weapons, to work the mines, in order to make progress in processing 
and technical procedures; European art and theater were beginning to penetrate and 
little by little Western science slowly began to spread as well.
The beginning of these contacts and the inclusion of Russia “in Europe” do not 
have a certain date. If, for example, in 1492 the American continent was geographically 
open to European exploration and colonization, Europe historically learned about 
Russia through a gradual process of contact with an autonomous entity. While 
America became a part of an emigrated, transplanted, and transformed European 
humanity, Russia showed the ambiguous and disquieting characters of a Eurasian “bi-
continentality”, which opposed to Europe as a unique and unknown – though not 
even as a “non-Europe” – part of it.
Unfamiliar and mysterious land for Europeans, Russia did not present itself without 
history, but, on the contrary, full of an extremely intense past that until the 17th century 
had enabled it to create its own art and literature as part of its own civilization, which 
was speciﬁc but, at the same time, homogeneous with the rest of Europe.
In that moment, when Russia started to discover both itself and the West, 
Europe began to discover Russia (Strada 1985: 15). At the beginning, the Eastern 
kingdom revealed itself only to merchants and ambassadors, who wrote diaries and 
ethnographical reportages trying to ﬁx the external characteristics of this land.
Collecting and classifying by topics European travelers’ reports on Muscovite, the 
great Russian historian Vasily Osipovich Kljuchevskij noted two contradictory aspects 
of the European attitude towards the ancient Russia (Kljuchevskij 1958). On the one 
hand, given the estrangement between Europe and Russia, which lasted until the end 
of the 17th century, Western civilization had been left in a state of almost total ignorance 
on the situation and on the destiny of this remote kingdom: this is why strange ideas 
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on it were born and rooted. But at the same time, no place had been described in such 
detail way as Muscovy. Kljuchevskij explains this contradiction with the fact that the 
more primitive and unknown for a traveler a country is, the more strongly exited the 
traveler remains, sharpening observation. It is important to add that for the European 
traveler Russia was not what China was for Marco Polo, it was not the “wholly other”, 
but, under its “Asian” exoticism of forms of life, it concealed and manifested a common 
nucleus to European civilization: Christianity. Russia, then, was for the European both 
diﬀerent and similar.
At the beginning of the 18th century, the European “discovery” of Russia moved 
from this ﬁrst ethnographic phase to a second more complex and careful analysis.
In the era of the two great revolutions in America and France, even Russia lived its 
no less radical renewal, linked to the activity of Peter the Great, Tsar of Russia from 1682 
to 1725: albeit limited to a national level and therefore not as universal as the French 
and American ones, this Russian regeneration was a more subversive revolution in its 
speciﬁc area of action. It had been the ﬁrst big “modernization”, which carried out Russia 
of the Middle Ages and moved it in modern history, shifting the political, economic 
and cultural reference of the whole country from Byzantium to Western Europe (Strada 
1985: 23).
With a series of successful military campaigns, but especially with his vast work 
of modernization of the country, Peter I was able to transform a backward State in an 
empire that could compete with the major Western nations. Under his reign, Russia 
became a major European power; the new ruler introduced in Russia the European 
scientiﬁc, technological, cultural and political knowledge.
In 1696, after the foundation of a river ﬂeet – and the creation de facto of the ﬁrst 
Russian Navy – Peter tore the Ottoman fortress of Azov, a strategic stronghold for 
the sea control, ensuring an outlet to the Black Sea. Concerned by the growing of the 
Swedish power, two years later he tried to secure control of the Eastern part of the Baltic 
Sea and initiated military preparations for an attack on Sweden. Although the Great 
Northern War (1700-1721) began under bad auspices, with a defeat at Narva in 1700, 
Peter did not give up and in 1709, at the end of the Poltava campaign, brought one of 
the most important military victories of Russian history. In 1721, with the agreements 
of Nystad Treaty, which ended the war, Russia gained the control of a vast zone of the 
Baltic shoreline, later known under the name of “Baltic provinces”.
The last war campaign of Peter I took place in the biennium 1722-1723 against 
Persia and assured Russia a Southern coastal region of the Caspian Sea.
This foreign policy attracted the attention of Europe. The wars against Sweden 
and the ﬁghting with Poland put the Tsar almost daily in contact with the West. The 
creation of St. Petersburg, the “window on Europe”, in 1703, on a Swedish territory 
recently conquered and the transfer of the capital to this city, showed better than any 
other decision the Russian willingness to move towards the West.
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Nevertheless, Peter I struggled a lot to form alliances with European princes, 
who distrusted him. It was the Poltava victory to force them to accept him (Duroselle 
1964: 162) and his “entrance” in Europe is technically marked by the dates when the 
European countries recognized the Western title of “Emperor” which Peter started to 
use since 1721, to replace the Eastern Byzantine title of “Tsar”: 1721 for Prussia and the 
United Provinces; 1723 for Sweden; 1733 for Saxony; 1741 for Ottoman Empire; 1742 for 
Austria and England; 1745 for France and Spain; ﬁnally, 1764 for Poland.
From the birth of the modern Tsarist kingdom with Peter the Great, Russia entered 
openly in competition with the Ottoman Empire and Persia, not only for the defense 
of its territory, but for the monitoring of the entire Caucasus region. It was immediately 
evident that the Russian penetration was not only commercial and political, but had 
also a strong ethnic color in the sense that the Cossacks (Russian or Ukrainian), or 
other nationalities began to settle more and more numerous in the Caucasus.
In domestic matters, Peter I put into eﬀect numerous reforms, including the 
reduction of the power of the boyars and the transformation of the Patriarchy of the 
Orthodox Church in a synod controlled by the Tsar. The reforms of Peter the Great 
provoked such a sharp break between the old Muscovite Russia and the new European 
Russia, that for two centuries the whole Russian culture lived the problem of continuity 
and discontinuity between these two stages of development, trying to grasp what 
persisted of “Russian” and developed in the process of “modernization”, traumatically 
began at dawn of the 18th century.
The renovation process, Westernization and territorial enlargement started by 
Peter I continued with Catherine the Great, who reigned from 1762 to 1796.
In those years, the Russian Empire expanded considerably: as a result of the 
two wars against the Ottoman Empire – the ﬁrst from 1768 to 1774 and the second 
from 1787 to 1791 – and of the annexation of the Crimean Khanate in 1783 – oﬃcially 
sanctioned by treaty with the khan Shaghin-Ghirej –, Russia secured the control of 
the Northern coast of the Black Sea, while on the West the Empress proceeded to the 
incorporation of large territories during the three partitions of Poland.
The 18th century was a century so crucial for the Russian national spirit, which ﬁrst 
fully aﬃrmed with Peter’s ideals and then was forged through the wars of Catherine. 
The climax of patriotism, however, would have recorded with the anti-Napoleonic 
wars of the early 19th century, which marked de facto the ﬁnal entry of Russia into the 
consent of the European powers.
However, just before arriving to that moment, the great Russian intellectuals of 
the time, the leaders of the so-called intelligentsja, were divided into two opposing 
schools of thought, Westernism (or Occidentalism) and Slavophilism, in a ﬁght that 
would never be played in open ﬁeld.
The Westerners looked at Russian backwardness in the light of the Western 
European liberal values, such as political and civil freedom, the rationalistic philosophical 
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tradition and scientiﬁc progress. They insisted on the need for Russia to appropriate of 
the achievements of Western civilization, particularly the neighboring Europe, in front 
of which it seemed to be in a peculiar lagging. They considered the works of Peter the 
Great exceptionally important as they could open a “window on Europe” within the 
great Empire. On behalf of their ideals, Westerners denied any meaning to the life lived 
up before Peter’s reforms and compared history, traditions, fairy tales, moral concepts 
of the Russian-speaking world with the ideals of the Roman-Germanic world.
The Slavophiles, on the contrary, enhanced the cultural and spiritual heritage 
of the Russian people opposing, through its political and philosophical ideas, to the 
liberal and industrialized culture, which characterized the European people. Looking 
back on the whole national history, Slavophiles would have arrived at a conception 
which regarded Russia as a force destined to renew not only itself, but also the whole 
of humanity thanks to the innate virtues of the Russian people and to the possibility 
of a development in a collectivist sense of the “communities” (mir) of the farmers, 
avoiding the evils of Western individualism and disruptor of industrial capitalism.
It was a debate that highlighted the typical bipolar vision not only of the Russian 
world, but also of those Slavic peoples located between Eastern and Western worlds. 
This is a vision that still appears today inevitably rooted in the speeches of the current 
political leaders.
The research of the Russian speciﬁcity continued during the 19th century. While 
Russia was trying to form its own peculiar consciousness, the West, in front of the 
giant which was growing visibly, began to form a new self-consciousness. Tsarist 
Russia became meanwhile a key player in European politics, having a crucial role in 
the defeat of Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna, the Holy Alliance, the Crimean War 
and the systematization of Eastern Europe on the eve of World War I.
2. Soviet Union and Integrated Europe
Meanwhile, in the West some precursors of the integrated Europe were thinking 
about a new vision of the continent. The projects for European uniﬁcation began to 
circulate, albeit with little importance, and the future Bolsheviks analyzed their content 
in view of a contribution to the internationalist strategies.
The ﬁrst analysis about the Russian relations with a hypothetical integrated Europe 
dates back to September 1914, when the continental uniﬁcation question was for the 
ﬁrst time raised in the Tsarist Empire by Leon Trotsky, who published a pamphlet The 
War and the International (The Bolsheviks and World Peace)1.
With a far-sighted vision and in many ways forerunner of his times, the author 
argued that the cause of World War I was not the irredentist Serb attack in Sarajevo or 
the desires of independence of the rebelling nationalities in the multinational Austro-
Lara Piccardo
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1 The pamphlet was ﬁrst published in German with the title Der Krieg und die Internationale.
Hungarian Empire. The reason of war was the inability of the national State, as unitary 
and autonomous economic territory, to give a positive response to the underlying 
needs of the international, tumultuous, and not regulated growth of national 
economies and, consequently, to resolve conﬂicts in Europe and worldwide.
Lenin – whose antitheses against Trotsky were not yet clearly deﬁned even about 
the “permanent revolution” – initially maintained a certain reserve on the question. 
However, on 23 August 1915, in his article “On the Slogan for a United States of Europe”2, 
published in the German review Sotsial-Demokrat, he wrote that if on the political level 
there was no contradiction between European uniﬁcation and socialist revolution, in 
economic terms, however, things changed. The United States of Europe would constitute 
a temporary agreement “between the European capitalists” (Lenin 1974), with the 
sole purpose of destroying socialism. Nevertheless, what worried Lenin the most was 
both the possibility of doubt that the slogan of the United States of Europe could have 
generated about the victory of socialism in one country, and the international relations 
of this new State. Lenin feared that the prospect of European uniﬁcation could paralyze 
the revolutionary forces in a waiting condition or give a paciﬁst illusion on the viability 
of this uniﬁcation of capitalist foundations (Monteleone 1975: 83).
Since then, the Soviet Union was always hostile to any form of continental 
integration. During World War II, on 11 January 1944, Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador 
in London, and Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet ambassador in Washington from 1941 to 
1943, delivered a memorandum to Stalin. In their view, it was “not in the interests of the 
Soviet Union, at least in the ﬁrst period after the war, to foster the creation of various 
kinds of [European] federations”3. The consensus was that the USSR should remain an 
unchallenged land power in Europe, without even a shadow of countervailing power 
represented by another State or a group of smaller States.
When the Schuman Plan and the Pleven Plan were launched at the beginning of the 
Fifties, Stalin evaluated them only in the context of the process of the militarization of 
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Moscow did not understand the true essence 
of the European construction process: the political aspect of uniﬁcation took second 
place and Soviet leaders always little discussed it. Considering the European uniﬁcation 
as a dangerous process intended to strengthen capitalism and to support Atlanticism, 
a feeling of worry and anxiety prevailed in the Kremlin, especially in relation to the 
military nature of Western initiatives and to the delicate German question. Indeed, 
until the Gorbachev period the expression “European integration” was never used 
by the Soviet mass media, journalists and political scientists. The word “integration” 
was always to be written in quotation marks or parentheses, and accompanied by the 
compulsory adjective “imperialist” (Zaslavsky 2003: 58).
Under Khrushchev, the Soviet leadership developed a new diplomacy but, despite 
the initial rejection of the Stalin ways, as soon as the Rome Treaties were signed on 25 
20 De Europa
Vol. 2, No. 2 (2019)
Looking to Each Other: 
Russian-European Relations among Hostility and Fear
2 The article is now collected in Lenin Collected Works. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974, vol. 21, 339-343.
3 Majskij Molotovu, AVPRF (Archiv vnešnej politiki Rossijskoj Federatisi, Archive of Foreign Politics of the Russian 
Federation), fond 06, opis’ 6, papka 14, delo 145, p. 5.
March 1957, Khrushchev and his diplomats expressed a strong opposition to the new 
European Communities (Forte 1968).
The week before the signature of the Treaties, Moscow submitted a proposal to 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe: the proposal included a draft 
treaty for an all-European economic co-operation. A Soviet Foreign Ministry statement 
was attached to the draft proposal: it warned of the dangers of the EEC to the world 
peace and stability (“Soviet Proposal” 1957: 156). In 1957 and 1962, two papers were 
released by a number of experts of the Soviet Academy of Sciences that accused the 
EEC of being the economic ground of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and a form of neo-colonialism, created for the better exploitation of the working class, 
based on the expansionist dreams of Germany (Dutoit 1964: 41-42).
The ﬁrst paper was published on the review Kommunist4 and was entitled “17 
Theses on the Common Market”, even if it was known with the title “On the Creation 
of the Common Market and of European Atomic Energy Community” as well.
The “17 Theses” stated that, under the guise of the European construction, the 
“imperialist” promoters of the continental integration had divided Europe into 
economic, political and military groups, which were opposed to each other, creating 
an aggressive military bloc of Western powers, directed against the Soviet Union 
and the other People’s democracies in Europe. All these measures were taken more 
often on the initiative, and in all cases with the active support of US leaders, who 
were the head of the “imperialist camp”. The document also described the contents 
of the Treaties of Rome, thus proving how the authors, while presenting analysis and 
specious propaganda, punctually knew the Western materials. Finally, the “17 Theses” 
prescribed to the Western Communist Parties to denounce the reactionary and 
aggressive character of the European Communities, in order to avert the prospect of 
nuclear war, and instead strengthen the peaceful coexistence of States with diﬀerent 
social systems.
The second paper as well gave negative judgments on European integration, 
whose backbone was the “union between the clerical and military dictatorship of 
Adenauer and the authoritarian regime of general de Gaulle”5. Published in Pravda on 
26 August 1962, the paper was entitled “32 Theses on the Common Market”, but was 
also known as “On Imperialistic Integration in Western Europe”. In the document the 
EEC was considered an ephemeral success that would collapse at the ﬁrst diﬃculties 
and the contrasts among the capitalist States were destined to sharpen more and 
more, hampering eﬀorts, especially Americans’, to smooth them. The USSR – refusing 
to recognize the Communities (Lysén 1987: 84; Morawiecki 1989: 3) – and the socialist 
camp had on their side nothing to fear because “our countries have become (…) in such 
a powerful force that no ‘Common Market’ constitutes a threat to us” (Pravda 1962).
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4 Kommunist, 1957, 88-102. The document was published also in the IMEMO review (1957), Mirovaja ekonomika 
i meždunarodnye otnošenija [World Economy and Intenational Relations], 83-96.
5 Ibidem.
The events of the following years did not conﬁrm the Soviet theses. If it is true that 
European integration experienced a setback, it did not dissolve.
In the Brezhnev period, the same approach towards the EEC prevailed. The Soviet 
goals were now the fragmentation of Western Europe and its separation from the 
United States (Adomeit 1984: 9). The Soviets used propaganda again and in 1971-1972 
the Muscovite review La vie internationale (published in Russian, but also in French 
and English in order to be addressed to a Western audience) dedicated eight articles 
to the European integration process, bitterly criticizing it. Other four articles expressed 
the Soviet position against the ﬁrst enlargement of the European Communities and 
denounced Chinese openings to the EEC.
In the 1980s, the Soviet position radically changed mainly because of Mikhail 
Gorbachev (Rey 2015). Facing in 1985-1986 strong economic problems, the new Soviet 
leadership was for the ﬁrst time willing to admit the reality of these problems and was 
able to look for a global solution to them. It called for a completely new attitude to 
international relations, the so-called “New Thinking”.
Three practical ideas emerged from this innovative approach: peaceful coexistence 
had to be cooperative, true security had to be mutual, and the USSR and the US had 
to promote the concept of “reasonable suﬃciency” in their strategic thinking. These 
principles resulted in a resumption of dialogue between the Americans and the Soviets 
concerning nuclear weapons as well as the end of Soviet involvement in many parts of 
the world (Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan ﬁrst of all).
In his address to the 43rd UN General Assembly Session on 7 December 1988, 
Gorbachev talked of a “new world order”, and on 6 July 1989, addressing the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, he outlined his idea of “a Common 
European Home”. At that time, there was still an opportunistic dimension in Gorbachev’s 
proposals: since the relations between the USSR and its Eastern satellites became 
increasingly diﬃcult and their economic exchanges weakened, the Kremlin had a clear 
economic incentive to develop trade and exchanges with Western Europe.
However, Gorbachev’s perception of Europe was becoming more global and 
ambitious. In his mind, “the Common European Home” (Casier 2018) could contribute 
to evacuate the bipolarity of the world, to bring in this way security to the continent, 
and to provide a framework in which the reformed USSR and its reformed Eastern 
satellites could grow. This framework would be based on a “socialism with a human 
face”, a socialism that would be tolerant, respectful of others’ values, of the principle 
of renunciation of force and of freedom of choice.
The concept of “Common European Home” remained an idea more than a concrete 
political strategy, but it did not preserve Gorbachev from the disappointments of the 
Soviet leadership.
Gorbachev also began the slow rapprochement between EEC and the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON or CMEA). Already in 1986, the Soviet General 
22 De Europa
Vol. 2, No. 2 (2019)
Looking to Each Other: 
Russian-European Relations among Hostility and Fear
Secretary expressed hopes for the revival of COMECON, advanced the Soviet candidacy 
to the GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariﬀs) and started negotiations for the 
conclusion of an agreement with the European Community.
Under the aegis of Gorbachev, the CMEA accepted the so-called “parallel 
approach”, under which the EEC could enter into bilateral commercial agreements 
with the members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, but not with the 
Western organization itself.
The new attitude of the Soviet government to the European Community was 
conﬁrmed by a recognition agreement signed in Brussels on 25 June 1988 by the 
European Commission and the COMECON, which followed the opening of negotiations 
for an economic agreement between the USSR and the EEC.
Between 1988 and 1990, the European Community was then able to reach several 
key results. It established diplomatic relations with Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEEC), eliminated the import quotas applied for a long to diﬀerent goods, 
extended the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to the East and concluded in 
short the so-called “ﬁrst generation” trade and cooperation agreements with Poland 
and Hungary in the late Eighties. Moreover, in order to provide ﬁnancial support 
to Central and Eastern reconstruction, the EC gave birth to the PHARE program 
(Pologne-Hongrie Assistance à la Restructuration Economique, Poland-Hungary Aid for 
the Reconstruction of the Economy), created by the EEC Regulation no. 3906 of 18 
December 1989 and in force from the following year.
Despite the pressures of Communitarian agricultural and industrial lobbies6, these 
measures allowed the rapid development of trade between the Community and the 
East of the Continent (Pravda 1992). The members of CMEA abandoned the internal 
trading system (Daviddi 1992), allowing before the EC and then the European Union 
(EU) to become their most important economic partner.
However, these relations lasted for a short time. In Budapest, on 29 June 1991, the 
forty-sixth (and ﬁnal) plenary session of the CMEA signed its dissolution protocol. The 
decision had become inevitable, because in September 1990 the Soviet Union, already 
proven by a long process that would lead to its collapse, announced that, starting from 
1 January 1991, it would withdraw from the exchange rate system of CMEA.
3. After the Cold War
A new dimension of the relations between Russia and the EU developed following 
the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the advent of the new Russia on its ruins.
From that date, a new and more intense period of contact between the parties 
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6 These lobbies insisted that the EEC states would have disadvantages without an adequate protection from 
the lower costs of labor and the lower environmental standards in the CEEC.
It is necessary to remember that, under Yeltsin’s presidency, Moscow had continued 
to assign to the relations with Brussels a role that was subordinate to an agreement with 
Washington: this orientation was the result of the idea that, despite severe economic 
diﬃculties, Russia continued to be a superpower and had to negotiate on an equal level 
with the United States. In those years, Russian-European communications were able 
to overcome recurring tensions, due largely to initiatives by the Russian government, 
at international and domestic level, in breach of the standards of democratic and 
responsible behavior, formally sanctioned between the parties (breach of human rights, 
restrictions to freedom of the press, repression of minorities). Even the expansion of 
the EU to Eastern Europe, which was central to a lively debate in Moscow (Dundovich 
2004), failed to prevent the progress of mutual relations.
The purpose of this political line was the deﬁnition of an organic and articulate 
system of relations, responding to the desire by Russians and Europeans to satisfy the 
implicit commitment in a strategic partnership. On the Russian side, the awareness 
that Moscow was facing a EU seeking release from the condition of “economic giant, 
political dwarf” contributed to the commitment with Western Europe.
The focus on the political and diplomatic relationship responded to Brussels’ hopes, 
providing a signiﬁcant contribution to the eﬀort undertaken to acquire an important 
role in terms of intercontinental relations. In fact, albeit in terms that could not be 
compared to the type of privileged relations held with the United States, Russia was 
the other great power capable of oﬀering to the EU valid cooperation at international 
level.
In December 1990, during a meeting of the European Council in Rome, it emerged 
that the Community Member States were aware of the importance of the political and 
economic reforms being undertaken at the time by the Soviet Union for the promotion 
of peace and stability on the Continent and in the rest of the world.
In order to sustain and help the new political activities launched by Moscow, in 
July 1991, the then twelve European Member States created the TACIS Programme 
(Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States)7. This was 
conceived in consideration of just one partner, Gorbachev’s USSR. Shortly afterwards, 
the Soviet Union collapsed, ending up with the independence of the Baltic States and 
the creation of twelve independent republics.
It was on that occasion that the EU acknowledged the importance of sustaining 
the reformative impetus following the creation of the new States. Their decision to 
opt for democracy and for an economic system aimed towards the free market meant 
breaking with the structures and traditions that had been consolidated over decades 
and introducing new legal and administrative mechanisms to aﬃrm themselves as 
new autonomous States.
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7 Cf. EC/EURATOM Regulation no. 2157/91, 24 July 1991; EEC Regulation no. 2053/93, 19 July 1993; EC/EURATOM 
Regulation no. 99/2000, 29 December 1999: oﬃcial European Union website 
The TACIS Programme was aimed at the Russian Federation, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan and Mongolia as well, becoming a key instrument in political cooperation 
between the EU and its partner countries. The ﬁrst phase was completed on 31 
December 1999, but a second set of regulations (99/2000), adopted by the Council on 
29 December 1999, renewed the programme for 2000-2006.
Despite the role played by the TACIS Programme in supporting the transition of 
the Russian Federation to the state of law and free market, the milestone in Russian-
European relations was the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)8.
Signed in Corfu during the European Council held on 24-25 June 1994 and 
subsequently ratiﬁed by the parties – including Austria, Finland and Sweden, the three 
members that joined the EU in 1995 –, the PCA became eﬀective on 1 December 1997, 
at the end of the hostilities in Chechnya. The Agreement was based on the principles 
of promotion of international peace, security and the support of a democratic society 
based on political and economic freedom. It also intended to create an “economic 
cooperation of wide scope” (PCA, art. 56, par. 1) within the context of successful political 
and institutional dialogue inspired by the suggestions of the institutionalist approach, 
but the eﬀective commitment of both parties was required in order to produce results 
and not empty declarations of principles.
In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced another instrument used in Russian-
European relations: the common strategy. This was more than an act of mere and 
generalized address; it was a precise decision that was binding to the Council of the 
Union, reminding the European Council of its deﬁnition: “The European Council shall 
decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the 
Member States have important interests in common”9. In this case, the instructions 
were much more detailed. Targets were established, along with the duration of the 
strategy and the means made available. The Council of the Union was responsible for 
implementation, with the adoption of collective stances and actions.
The common strategy was adopted for the ﬁrst time during the European Council 
meeting held in Cologne, on 2-3 June 1999, in order to outline the general framework 
of European actions in relation to the Kremlin.
The strategy should last four years and emphasized the need for communication 
with Moscow and the development of the programme based upon cooperation. 
The speciﬁc initiatives pursued by the EU within the scope of the strategy concerned 
political dialogue and communication on security, economic matters, trade and 
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investments, energy, the ﬁght against organized crime and twinning programmes. 
These actions, however, were to be drawn up within the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement and be fully accomplished within it.
The PCA had a duration of ten years. Upon its expiry, in 2007, the new Russian 
President, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, showed no intention of entering into a new 
agreement, nor did the EU seem capable of oﬀering tangible and shared counter-
proposals: so far, at the moment EU and Russia share no agreement about their 
relations.
Meanwhile, the EU had tried to boost cooperation with Moscow, activating 
another “foreign policy” instrument. During the European Parliament Session held 
on 18 December 2002, the then President of the European Commission, Romano 
Prodi, launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), developed from 2003 to 
establish privileged relations with the countries bordering on the EU (Alcaro, Comelli 
2005), “sharing everything with the Union but institutions” (Prodi 2002). The ENP was 
centred on the promotion of democracy, freedom, prosperity, security and stability, 
while being conditioned by the reciprocal interest in respecting common values, 
speciﬁcally those of democracy, the state of law, human rights, good government and 
the principles of a sustainable development and market economy.
Having evolved after the latest expansion of the EU towards the broader 
formulation of the Wider Europe Neighbourhood Policy (WENP), it presented several 
important innovations. Firstly, the Commission’s intention to bring external relations 
between the EU and its neighbours under a single strategic design should be seen 
positively. Only in this way did it become possible to create “a ring of friends” (Prodi 
2002) and oﬀer a clearer deﬁnition of the scope of the Union’s external action. From 
this point of view, the policy of proximity made the boundaries within which to pursue 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) more visible.
The construction of peaceful and cooperative relations around the EU corresponded 
to a plan by Brussels aimed at the creation of an area of commercial integration and 
close institutional cooperation, really capable of making the old concept of frontier as 
a “limit” obsolete, with the foundation of a new concept of “link”.
This, however, seems more of a moral philosophy than a political practice. An 
example is the Russian-Georgian conﬂict of summer 2008. Putin was Prime Minister at 
the time: having been elected President for two consecutive terms (2000-2004; 2004-
2008), he could not stand for a third. One of his right-hand men had, however, been 
elected in his stead. Dmitri Anatolevich Medvedev was President until 4 March 2012, 
when Putin was reinstated in the highest oﬃce in the Russian Federation.
In the night between 7 and 8 August 2008, the Georgian army moved into Ossetia, 
which had declared its independence. The following day, on 9 August, the Russian 
Federation, which had had a military presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 
1992, as interposition force by international mandate, heavily intervened, blocking the 
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Georgians and occupying a very large part of the territory, advancing to within a few 
dozen kilometers of the capital, Tbilisi.
On 15 August, Georgia and Russia signed a preliminary agreement on the ceaseﬁre, 
with the mediation of the European Union led by the President at the time, Nicolas 
Sarkozy. On the bases of the agreement, a mutual commitment was made to withdraw 
the troops to their positions prior to start of hostilities, and obliging Georgia to abstain 
from taking action against the two secessionist republics. After an initial withdrawal 
from the front, from the town of Gori for instance, Russia had decided to continue its 
military occupation of two buﬀer areas in Georgia to prevent possible attacks towards 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. These areas of occupation initially included the port of 
Poti on the Black Sea, as well as the presence of several Russian checkpoints on the 
main national access routes, lasting about two months. From 1 October 2008, 200 EU 
military observers were assigned to the two buﬀer areas, as envisaged in the meetings 
held between Moscow and Brussels in September. The withdrawal of Russian troops 
from the buﬀer area near South Ossetia was completed on 8 October 2008.
Russia acknowledged the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on 26 
August 2008, subsequently signing military agreements with the two Republics.
It should be noted that, in this case too, crisis prevention measures had no eﬀect 
and the European Union found itself having to cope no longer with a crisis, but with 
a war, for which it was completely unprepared. The attitudes of the Member States 
were not always convergent and this revealed, once again, all the weakness typical of 
a foreign policy, which was not “common” but, rather, “traditional”.
In an attempt to repair the damages caused by the Russian-Georgian war and 
develop better forms of prevention, on 7 May 2009, at the Prague Summit, the EU 
launched six Eastern Partnerships (EPs) with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldavia, and Ukraine. For Europe, the partnership means greater security and stability 
along the Eastern frontiers, considering that the region has become a hive of crisis and 
is still suﬀering the eﬀects of the well-known “frozen conﬂicts” (Lynch 2002).
4. The Crisis of 2013 and the Russian Annexation of Crimea
The request for ratiﬁcation of the Eastern Partnership triggered the complex and 
delicate Ukrainian crisis. When, in November 2013, under pressure from the Kremlin 
relating mainly to the energy question, President Janukovych suspended negotiations 
with the European Union, peaceful protests began in Kiev. Janukovych, elected in 
2010 thanks to strong support from the Crimean and Southern and Eastern Ukrainian 
electorate, condemned the protests, deciding at the end of the month to bring in the 
Ukrainian special forces, the Berkut. The protest became a situation of urban warfare 
and dissent began to increase against Janukovych who, on 22 February 2014, was 
forced to ﬂee Kiev following his de-legitimisation by Parliament. This was followed 
by the liberation of the former Prime Minister, Julija Timoshenko, but, while the new 
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power tried to take hold, protests started up in several cities with a Russian majority, 
which condemned the events as a coup d’état and a danger to their communities.
This triggered further political crises in diﬀerent Ukrainian regions, ﬁrst and 
foremost Crimea. Here, on 27 February 2014, unidentiﬁed troops, suspected of being 
led directly by Moscow, occupied the Crimea Supreme Council building and that of the 
Council of Ministers in Simferopol, where Russian ﬂags began ﬂying. In this situation 
of increasing chaos, the Crimean Regional Parliament appointed Sergeyj Valerijovich 
Aksyonov, representative of Russian Unity, the Russian minority party, as Prime Minister 
of the Crimean Autonomous Republic. The appointment was censored as illegal by 
the government of Kiev, which declared Aksyonov to be wanted pursuant to art. 109 
of the Ukrainian Criminal Code – an article relating to acts of violent amendment or 
overturning of constitutional order – and objected to all his acts. On the same day, the 
Crimean Berkut set up security checkpoints for entry to and exit from the isthmus of 
Perekop and the Chongar Peninsula, which separate Crimea from the mainland: in the 
space of just a few hours, Ukraine and Crimea were de facto divided.
Two days later, on 1 March 2014, Aksyonov announced that the new Crimean 
authorities would exercise control over all Ukrainian military installations on the 
peninsula and asked Putin to act as guarantor of peace and public order in Crimea. The 
invitation triggered immediate action by Russia and, that very same day, the Russian 
Duma ratiﬁed military intervention and sent troops and weapons to Sevastopol, 
causing protests by the international community.
Meanwhile, the Crimean Supreme Council announced a referendum on annexation 
to the Russian Federation. Initially planned for 25 May 2014, on 6 March the Assembly of 
Simferopol brought it forward to 16 March, emphasizing the fact that the consultation 
would involve Crimean citizens only.
Despite strong opposition from Kiev, where Parliament issued the act of dissolution 
of the Crimean Rada and the Constitutional Court declared the referendum to be 
illegal, the election went ahead as planned. It recorded an almost unanimous result 
in favor of joining Russia: approximately 96% of the Crimean voters answered yes to 
the question: “Are you in favor of reuniﬁcation of Crimea with Russia as constituent 
authority?” (Rizzi 2014).
On that same day, the United Nations Security Council voted by large majority for 
a resolution to declare the referendum invalid. This result was a foregone conclusion, 
proving Russia’s international isolation. The referendum was characterized by a 
conﬂict between two principles of international law. The ﬁrst principle was that of 
“self-determination of peoples”, sanctioned for the ﬁrst time in the Woodrow Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points on 8 January 1918 and invoked by the Crimean Republic and by 
Russia. The second principle was that of the “inviolability of frontiers and the territorial 
integrity of States”10, proclaimed in 1975 in the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference 
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81).
on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), evoked by Ukraine. These are equally 
valid principles in relation to which international law has still to express an opinion, 
opting in favor of one or the other.
On 17 March, after oﬃcially announcing the results of the referendum, the 
Crimean Supreme Council, renamed the Crimean State Council, declared the formal 
independence of the Crimean Republic, including the territories of the Crimean 
Autonomous Republic and the city of Sebastopol, which was granted special 
status within the juridical order of the Separatist Republic. The Crimean Parliament 
announced the partial abrogation of the Ukrainian laws, the adoption of the Russian 
ruble as oﬃcial currency, alongside the hryvnia (the Ukrainian currency), began the 
nationalization of the Ukrainian State’s assets and made a formal application to Russia 
for annexation.
This annexation came on 18 March, with the signing of the pertinent treaty by 
Vladimir Putin, the Russian President, Sergey Aksyonov, the Crimean President, and 
Aleksei Chalyj, Mayor of Sebastopol. The treaty became eﬀective three days later on 21 
March, with the approval of Russian federal constitutional law no. 611, Adhesion by the 
Crimean Republic to the Russian Federation and Formation within the Russian Federation 
of New Authorities – The Crimean Republic and the Federal City of Sevastopol12.
The international community did not recognize the annexation. The United States 
and the EU subsequently applied the so-called “intelligent sanctions”, which selectively 
penalize those close to the head of power, but which seem to be unable to induce a 
change in the Russian stance in relation to Crimea, which remains, for the moment, 
unchanged.
5. Conclusions
While the Ukrainian matter was still in progress, on 27 June 2014, the governments 
of Ukraine, Moldavia and Georgia signed Association Agreements with the EU, 
provoking a harsh reaction by Moscow.
Already on 10 June 2014, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Grigorj Karasin, 
commented the signature as follows: “Moldova’s signature of the association 
agreement with the European Union can complicate relations with Russia and put 
them to a serious test”13. Moscow felt that the Agreements signed with Brussels were 
incompatible with the areas of free market, which it had created with the countries in 
question, threatening to apply higher tariﬀs and stricter border controls.
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.
Moreover, it is clear how Putin intends to keep back Russia to its great past. After 
having solved the principle economic problems of Russia using the energy sector14, 
he moved to rebuilt the former Soviet space in Europe and he is now concentrating 
in coming back to play an important role in the Mediterranean Sea: Russian attitude 
toward Turkey and Syria is a signal of it.
Putin’s plan started years ago with the gradual return to Moscow of the former 
Soviet Union. The realignment maneuver took place in October 2014 with the creation 
of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), with the full membership of Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. The objective of the EAEU is to create a uniﬁed 
economic space between Europe and Asia: within it, the Kremlin obviously has a 
decisive role. Putin explained:
Eurasianism is a tradition of our political thought. It has been rooted in Russia for a 
long time, and now it is acquiring a completely new sound, especially in connection 
with the intensiﬁcation of integration processes in the post-Soviet space. (…) We 
need to adopt speciﬁc laws related to the regulation of the economy in the States 
of the Customs Union [it was the previous name of the EAEU] and in our common 
economic space. (…) An integration core has already taken place and is developing, 
but all our closest neighbors do not yet belong to this core, and economic logic will 
(…) encourage all our closest partners to participate in these integration processes 
(Putin 2012)15.
Putin uses EAEU for two purposes. On the one hand, it exerts pressure on the 
Eastern side of Europe, proposing attractive economic partnerships to those countries 
“disputed” with the EU. On the other hand, it tries to guarantee to Moscow a greater 
political role in Asia, favoring a merger on several levels between the EAEU countries 
and those adhering to the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and ASEAN 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations).
By placing itself at the center of this very extensive network of diplomatic and trade 
relations, Putin cultivates not only relations with Beijing but also with the other great 
powers of the Asian chessboard: ﬁrst and foremost Iran, Japan and India, States which 
are increasing solid partnerships in the energy and military sectors with Russia.
On relations with Moscow, the EU does not seem to have a clear strategy now. The 
diﬀerent intensity with which the European Member States are economically linked 
to Russia is one of the factors behind the lack of cohesion in Brussels’ policy with the 
East. The EU was divided once again when the Ukrainian crisis exploded and on the 
stance to take with regard to Moscow’s annexation of Crimea. The Baltic Republics 
and former satellite countries would have liked the West to react more strongly and 
decisively to the authoritarian return of Moscow in the post-Soviet space.
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The countries that have important economic relations with Russia in strategic 
sectors like energy – Italy, France and Germany – condemn Russian revanchism, while 
mediating within the EU to avoid exacerbating the tension and excessively isolating 
Russia.
Over the past years, expertise on Eastern Europe has been systematically 
reduced throughout the EU, to a point where it is impossible to adequately monitor 
political processes in Russia and the post-Soviet space. Moreover, broader political 
developments play a role in determining which issues absorb the attention of experts 
and political decision-makers. Between the Russo-Georgian war of August 2008 and 
the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, other major events such as the EU’s ﬁnancial 
and institutional crisis and the Arab Spring largely overshadowed Eastern Europe. The 
resulting policy was unable to respond in adequate detail to problems arising in the 
region’s various States. Its self-perception as a transformative force for peace made 
the EU blind to the growing geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe. Last but not least, 
internal disagreements within the EU also hampered the development of a consistent 
and proactive policy towards Russia (Fischer, Klein 2016: 5-6).
Urgent reﬂection by the EU seems necessary in relation to the signiﬁcant rise 
in consensus around Putin following the annexation of Crimea and on the eﬀects 
of his policies in the neighbourhood. If, on the Russian side, foreign policy can be 
traced back to a “new doctrine”16 of the Putin administration, Europe proposes the 
ambiguous nature of the external action of the EU against Russia. The absence of 
a clear long-term strategy and a lack of consistency and linearity in foreign policy, 
together with the recent initiatives proposed in the post-Soviet space and perceived 
by Moscow as damaging to its interests in the area, have contributed to determining 
today’s strong tension. The countries of the post-Soviet space are subject to oﬀers 
from stakeholders who represent models of political and economic integration, which 
collide, putting them in a position of fragility. Their oscillations between one pole 
and the other, according to a logic dictated by pragmatism, have had destabilizing 
eﬀects on domestic policy and have not favored democratic consolidation and good 
governance. In today’s multipolar world, the stakeholders are no longer merely the 
two old hegemonic powers, as the scenarios have been diversiﬁed. This explains the 
European position, weakened, however, by the absence of policies that really are 
community wide. It seems unnecessary to say that, when the EU decided to sign an 
Association Agreement with Kiev, it had to expect a reaction by the Kremlin.
Perhaps the EU has overestimated its “transformative” power and underestimated 
the weight of traditional geopolitics, contributing to ignite a now latent crisis “in the 
interregnum between the ‘no longer’ and the ‘not yet’” (Bauman, Mauro 2015).
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